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RULE 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, Plaintiffs-Appellants
Viacom International Inc., Comedy Partners, Country Music Television, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corporation, and Black Entertainment Television LLC, submit
the following statement identifying their parent corporations and any publicly held
corporation owning 10% or more of their stock:
Each of the Plaintiffs-Appellants is, directly or indirectly, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Viacom Inc., a company publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. No publicly traded company owns 10 percent or more of the stock of Viacom Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
YouTube went from a start-up to a multi-billion-dollar business between
2005 and 2008 by intentionally enabling and profiting from the posting of infringing clips of copyrighted shows and movies, including several highly popular shows
owned by plaintiff Viacom like South Park and The Daily Show. It was only in
2008 (more than a year after being acquired by Google and after succeeding in becoming entrenched as the dominant video site) that YouTube began using readilyavailable filtering software to screen out the copyrighted works of major content
companies like Viacom that had not licensed their content to YouTube.
Now, after more than six years of litigation and a prior reversal of summary
judgment by this Court, the district court has again granted summary judgment to
YouTube on its affirmative defense under Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). The renewed grant of summary
judgment, like the prior one, strips the Section 512(c) safe harbor of several key
independent requirements, reducing it to the notice-and-takedown provision in
subsection 512(c)(3). Failing to heed this Court’s guidance on remand, and ignoring much of the vast evidentiary record, the district court has again concluded that
the DMCA safe harbor places the entire burden of combating online piracy on content owners, and grants immunity even to avowedly piratical websites that “welcome” and benefit from massive infringement, as long as they comply with take-

1
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down notices initiated by copyright owners, scrupulously avoid learning the location of specific infringing clips, and do not “participate in” or “coerce” the infringing acts of users.
This grant of summary judgment is completely inconsistent with this Court’s
guidance on the “right-and-ability-to-control” and “knowledge” exceptions to the
DMCA safe harbor. Contrary to this Court’s instructions, the district court failed
to apply the Grokster inducement standard as a basis for determining the right and
ability to control, and failed fairly to apply the doctrine of willful blindness in assessing knowledge of infringement. Once these and other errors are corrected, the
grant of summary judgment must again be reversed.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338. It entered final judgment on April 30, 2013, and Viacom appealed that day. This Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Viacom,
there is at least a genuine dispute of fact about whether YouTube’s
practice of welcoming copyright infringement and its strategic use of
piracy to achieve its business objectives place it outside the safe harbor of
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) because:

2
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a. YouTube “receive[d] a financial benefit directly attributable to
infringing activity” that it had “the right and ability to control”; or
b. YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing
material on its site, or alternatively, willfully blinded itself to such
material, and failed to remove it.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively, “Viacom”) own the copyrights in thousands of popular movies and television shows that were uploaded, reproduced, displayed, performed, and distributed without authorization on the YouTube website
operated by Defendants-Appellees Google, Inc., YouTube, Inc. and YouTube LLC
(collectively, “YouTube” or “Defendants”). Viacom brought this copyright action
in 2007 in the Southern District of New York (Stanton, J.).
YouTube asserted an affirmative defense under Section 512(c) of the
DMCA. After fact discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
1

The district court granted YouTube’s motion and entered judgment. SPA30-32.

Viacom appealed, and this Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. SPA66-67. On remand, the district court granted YouTube’s renewed

1

References to the “SPA” identify the page number where the cited material appears in the special appendix.

3
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motion for summary judgment on its DMCA affirmative defense and again entered
judgment. SPA96-98.
I.

YouTube’s Founders Build A Business Based On Infringement.
YouTube was founded in February 2005 by Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and

Jawed Karim, who had worked together at Internet start-up PayPal before it was
2

sold to eBay for $1.5 billion. JAXI-2520. YouTube’s founders likewise aimed to
establish YouTube’s popularity rapidly and cash in by selling it: “[O]ur dirty little
secret . . . is that we actually just want to sell out quickly.” JAV-1355; JAXI-2542.
Accordingly, Chen urged his associates to “concentrate all of our efforts in building up our numbers as aggressively as we can through whatever tactics, however
evil.” JAV-1173; JAXI-2566.

3

YouTube was to be a self-described “consumer media company” operating
over a website (www.youtube.com) and other distribution platforms. JAXI-2521.
The content would come from users, who would be invited to upload videos so
2

References to the “JA” identify the volume and page number(s) where the cited
material appears in the 23-volume joint appendix filed by the parties.
3
Notably, almost none of these key internal communications were produced by
YouTube. Hurley “lost” all of his YouTube e-mails for the crucial 18-month period from YouTube’s founding until its acquisition by Google, and all of Chen’s
email for the same period also went missing. JAVI-1483-84 (Hurley Dep.); DCt.
R. Dkt. No. 191 ¶¶ 263-265 (Hohengarten Decl.). The emails produced from this
period are those that Karim, who left YouTube in 2006, preserved on his personal
computer. Id. ¶¶ 218-221, 263-265.

4
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long as they granted YouTube an unrestricted “worldwide . . . license to use, reproduce, distribute, . . . display, and perform the [video].” JAXI-2761. Uploaded
videos generally could be watched by anyone. The business model was to sell advertising seen by those using the site.
The goal, one of the co-founders observed, was to make YouTube “just like
TV,” with users “who keep coming back,” and advertisers who pay for access to
that audience. JAXI-2533. YouTube accordingly assumed complete editorial control over the site – for example, systematically removing videos that conflicted
with its business interests, such as videos that contained violence, sex, or hate
speech that could offend viewers and advertisers, and sometimes making videos
accessible only to users who satisfied age-verification requirements. JAXI-255456, 2592-93, 2706-07; JAII-271-317.
From the outset, the founders knew users were uploading vast quantities of
infringing clips, including from Viacom-owned shows like South Park that they
identified by name. JAV-1314; JAXI-2528-51 (¶¶ 31-32, 37-39, 43, 45-48, 51, 5359). The founders also understood that this infringing material was critical to their
plan of “building up [their] numbers aggressively” by attracting users. JAXI-2566.
They therefore embraced the infringement and took concrete steps to facilitate it.
Indeed, the founders viewed notifications of infringement from copyright owners

5
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as a badge of success – one co-founder told the others in response to a cease-anddesist letter, “haha, awesome!!! a sign of our continuing success.” JAXII-2937.
Consistent with this plan to facilitate and profit from infringement, the
founders also uploaded infringing videos themselves. One email noted that Karim
was “putting stolen videos on the site.” JAV-1328; JAXI-2537. Chen recognized
the company would have “a tough time defending the fact that we’re not liable for
the copyrighted material on the site because we didn’t put it up when one of the cofounders is blatantly stealing content from other sites and trying to get everyone to
see it.” Id. Yet, on another occasion, Chen himself emailed about a video, saying
“steal it!”

JAV-1335; JAXI-2539.

When Hurley expressed concern about

“steal[ing] the movies,” Chen countered, “we need to attract traffic. . . . [T]he only
4

reason why our traffic surged was due to a video of this type.” Id.

When the Supreme Court decided Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), condemning inducement of infringement over
the Internet, Hurley recognized the threat to YouTube, telling his co-founders:
“we need views, [but] I’m a little concerned with the recent Supreme Court ruling

4

Similarly, when YouTube’s Internet service provider complained that YouTube
was violating its user agreement, Chen believed the violation was because “we’re
hosting copyrighted content.” JAV-1316; JAXI-2531. His response: “i’m not
about to take down content because our ISP is giving us shit.” Id.

6

Case: 13-1720

Document: 35

Page: 14

07/26/2013

1001125

67

on copyrighted material.” JAV-1326; JAXI-2535. Yet YouTube’s reliance on infringing videos trumped that concern.
Hence, throughout the summer of 2005, the founders searched for ways to
continue exploiting infringing videos while trying “to avoid the copyright bastards,” as they referred to copyright owners. JAV-1317; JAXI-2531. First, to
create an appearance of compliance, they removed some blatantly infringing videos while keeping many others – including “comedy clips,” a Viacom specialty.
JAI-257; see also JAXI-2535-43. Hurley told the others: “save your meal money
for some lawsuits!” JAV-1321; JAXI-2535.
Then, in September 2005, the founders adopted a new policy that YouTube
followed until May 2008, even after Google purchased the site in October 2006.
They decided to keep substantially all infringing videos on YouTube unless and
until a copyright owner located a specific infringing clip and sent YouTube a “takedown notice” identifying the clip by URL, in which case YouTube would remove that specific clip – but no others of the same show.
This decision is reflected in a September 3, 2005, email exchange between
the founders with the subject-line “copyrighted material!!!” JAV-1323-25. Hurley
started the exchange with “aaahhh, the site is starting to get out of control with copyrighted material.” JAV-1325. Chen argued against removing the infringing videos because they were what attracted 80% of site traffic: “if you remove the poten-

7
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tial copyright infringements . . . site traffic and virality will drop to maybe 20% of
what it is.” JAV-1324. Karim proposed they “just remove the obviously copyright
infringing stuff,” but Chen insisted that even if they removed only that content,
“we go from 100,000 views a day down to about 20,000 views or maybe even lower.” JAV-1323.
To justify keeping the “obviously copyright infringing stuff,” the founders
embraced the pretense that the countless clips on YouTube stolen from popular
movies and TV shows were actually owned by the uploading users. Chen explained: “the copyright infringement stuff I mean, we can presumably claim that
we don’t know who owns the rights to that video and by uploading, the user is
5

claiming that they own that video.” JAV-1323.

Based on this avowed fiction,

YouTube would keep all infringing videos until it got a takedown notice. Using
the example of a clip pirated from CNN, Chen outlined how this policy would ensure a supply of infringing clips, because the inevitable time-lag involved in takedown notices could never stem the floodtide of infringing uploads:
i really don’t see what will happen. what? someone from cnn sees it?
he happens to be someone with power? he happens to want to take it
5

In fact, many of Viacom’s clips-in-suit were uploaded with an accompanying description admitting they were pirated. JAXII-2926. (“I don’t care if my account
[sic] get’s closed for this, this episode was great, and this is the part everyone’s
laughing about.^^I did not create this material. All contents are copyright of
Comedy Central.”).

8
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down right away. he gets in touch with cnn legal. 2 weeks later, we
get a cease & desist letter. we take the video down.
JAV-1337.
This policy was reinforced by YouTube management’s repeated and deliberate efforts to avoid learning which specific clips were infringing. For example,
YouTube maintains a “community flagging” feature that allows users to flag for
YouTube’s attention videos that violate YouTube’s terms of use (e.g., pornography, hate speech, etc.). When this feature launched in September 2005, YouTube
also included the capacity for users to flag a video as “copyrighted.” JAXI-255256.
However, the founders saw copyright flagging primarily as windowdressing, creating, as Chen put it, “the perception . . . that we are concerned about
this type of material and we’re actively monitoring it.” JAV-1340. But, Chen continued, “the actual removal of this content will be in varying degrees.” Id. Comparing YouTube to the flickr website, Chen emphasized that through this policy,
“you can find truckloads of . . . copyrighted content” if you are “actively searching
for it.” Id.
But even that window-dressing soon proved too much. The founders quickly realized that copyright flagging put YouTube on notice of infringement, and
within two weeks Hurley directed the discontinuation of copyright flagging “asap”:

9
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can we remove the flagging link for “copyrighted” today. . . . basically if we don’t remove them we could be held liable for being served a
notice. it’s actually better if we don’t have the link there at all because then the copyright holder is responsible for serving us notice of
the material and not the users.
JAV-1341.
That decision not only kept the floodgates open for stolen content, but also
sent the inviting message to YouTube users that the website was a safe place for
infringement. Indeed, shutting off community flagging for copyright meant that
even when over three thousand Viacom clips-in-suit were flagged and reviewed by
YouTube for potential terms-of-use violations other than copyright, the clips were
still “approved” to remain on YouTube despite being blatantly infringing. A
“YouTube Content Policy Training” guide even highlighted Viacom’s Daily Show
as an example of content for YouTube’s reviewers to “approve.” JAXI-2557, 2780
(Wilkens Decl. ¶ 2(e)); JAXII-2800-2921.
In February 2006, Maryrose Dunton, YouTube’s lead Product Manager, reported to Chen that she “did a little exercise on Friday and went through all the
most viewed/most discussed/top favorites/top rated [videos on YouTube] to try and
figure out what percentage is or has copyrighted material. it was over 70%.” JAV1198; JAXI-2574. Dunton joked that she had “flagged” the infringing videos for
removal. Id. But pursuant to YouTube policy, the videos actually remained on the

10
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site. JAXI-2576. A month later, Dunton again estimated “probably 75-80% of our
views come from copyrighted material.” JAV-1211; JAXI-2579.
Around the same time, Dunton and a YouTube engineer discussed implementing an automated anti-infringement tool to alert copyright owners when suspected infringing content was uploaded, but even though implementation “[wa]sn’t
hard” and would only have “take[n] another day or w/e,” Dunton killed the project
because she “hate[d] making it easier for these a-holes” – referring to copyright
owners. JAV-1276; see also JAXI-2584-86.. YouTube also torpedoed other antiinfringement tools proposed by Brent Hurley, Chad Hurley’s brother and YouTube’s Director of Finance. JAXI-2559-62, 2596-97.
The “blatantly illegal” infringement on YouTube – particularly of Viacom’s
copyrights – was starkly highlighted in a report that Karim distributed at
YouTube’s March 2006 board of directors meeting:
As of today episodes and clips of the following well-known shows
can still be found: Family Guy, South Park, MTV Cribs, Daily Show,
Reno 911, Dave [sic] Chapelle. . . . [W]e would benefit from preemptively removing content that is blatantly illegal and likely to attract
criticism. This will help to dispel YouTube’s association with Napster (Newsweek: “Is YouTube the Napster of Video?” . . . ).
JAV-1347. Viacom owns the copyrights in South Park, MTV Cribs, The Daily
Show, Reno 911, and Dave Chappelle – all but one of the “well-known shows” and
“content that is blatantly illegal” on YouTube. Hundreds of Viacom clips-in-suit
from these five shows were on YouTube when Karim submitted the report and

11
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were not removed until late 2006 or, in most cases, early 2007 when Viacom sent a
large number of takedown notices. Furthermore, in the two years following Karim’s warning to the YouTube board (until May 2008) thousands more infringing
clips-in-suit from these same Viacom programs were posted on YouTube. JAXI2779 (Wilkens Decl. ¶ 2(b)-(c)).
The founders’ intentional facilitation of infringement is highlighted by their
delayed, and later strategic, deployment of content-filtering technology, which
enables a service provider to instantaneously and automatically compare the digital
fingerprint of an uploaded clip to a database of digital fingerprints of copyrighted
works provided by copyright holders and, in the event of a match, block the upload
or flag it for review so that the infringing content never appears on the website.
JAXI-2717-29. Only site operators like YouTube can prevent piracy by filtering
out infringing content at upload, before it ever becomes public. Id.; see also
JAXIII-3081 (King Decl. ¶ 26). Filtering technology was commercially available,
reliable, and relatively inexpensive even before YouTube began operations, but
was not integrated into YouTube’s original design. JAXI-2717-29, 2740-42.
In spring 2006, the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), on
behalf of the major film studios including plaintiff Paramount Pictures, urged
YouTube to implement filtering technology.

JAVIII-1973-81.

After initially

seeming willing, YouTube backtracked, stating in a phone call involving Chen,

12
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YouTube’s general counsel, and an MPAA representative that YouTube would not
implement filtering for most copyright owners because “the copyrighted content on
YouTube was a major lure for their users.” JAXI-2678; JAVIII-1981.
II.

YouTube’s Infringement-Based Business Persists After Google Purchases YouTube.
Google’s awareness of the large-scale infringement on YouTube began early

in 2006 before it acquired the company, when Google surveyed the content on
YouTube and regarded the site “as a ‘rogue enabler’ of content theft,” and as
“completely sustained by pirated content.” JAII-445, 455. In contrast to YouTube, Google’s competing video-sharing site, Google Video, reviewed each video
at upload and blocked those that blatantly infringed copyrights. JAXI-2598-99.
But Google’s copyright compliance put it at a serious competitive disadvantage,
and Google understood that YouTube’s success was the result of its “[l]iberal copyright policy.” JAXI-2610, 2620-21.
Hence, Google executives engaged in a “heated debate” in 2006 “about
whether we should relax enforcement of our copyright policies in an effort to stimulate traffic growth.” JAII-528. While some argued that Google Video should
“beat YouTube” by “calling quits on our copyright compliance standards,” JAXI2612-13, and “play faster and looser and be aggressive until either a court says ‘no’
or a [licensing] deal gets struck,” JAXI-2627, others, including Google co-founder
Sergey Brin, questioned whether it was right for Google to “chang[e] policy [t]o

13
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increase traffic knowing beforehand that we’ll profit from illegal [d]ownloads.”
JAXI-2629.
Unable to compete with YouTube’s pirated content, Google decided to buy
YouTube for $1.65 billion in October 2006. Google’s due diligence confirmed it
was buying a business built on infringement. Google’s financial advisor Credit
Suisse told Google’s board that 60 percent of YouTube’s views were of “premium” copyrighted content, and that only 10 percent of that content was licensed.
JAVI-1417; JAXI-2636-37.
Google’s priority then became to preserve YouTube’s competitive advantage and lock in its dominant video position. CEO Schmidt directed YouTube “to
grow playbacks to 1b/day.” JAIII-581. With the focus still on rapid growth,
Google reversed its own prior copyright compliance policy and adopted YouTube’s, ensuring that every infringing video would remain on YouTube unless and
until the copyright owner detected it and sent a takedown notice. JAXI-2648-49.
But Defendants’ executives remained well aware of the vast infringement on YouTube. JAXI-2651-59. For example, an employee responsible for selecting videos
for prominent placement on the site reported that “we’re running into issues finding enough videos because they have so many copyright violations.” JAXI-2652.
In January 2007, after Google’s lawyers reviewed YouTube’s practices, Defendants decided “for legal reasons” to stop placing ads on watch pages of videos
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unless they had a content license from the real copyright owner, an implicit concession that they were previously extracting a direct financial benefit from infringing content. JAIII-791. However, Defendants continued to place ads on YouTube’s home, search, and browse pages, and thereby continued to monetize infringing content and the userbase it attracted. JAXI-2694-2705.
With infringement growing exponentially, the MPAA again pressed YouTube (and its new owners) to implement commercially available filtering technology to control infringement. JAXI-2681-82. Defendants eventually decided to
implement filtering technology offered by an industry leader, Audible Magic, and
offered it to many copyright owners, including Viacom, NBC, Disney, Fox, and
others, but only if they would agree to license their content to YouTube. JAXI2725-29. Thus, readily available technology that would have allowed YouTube to
identify, block and remove illicit clips became a tool to force content owners into
business deals.
At first, Defendants equivocated about whether they would also deploy Audible Magic to protect the works of content owners that declined to grant a license,
but in February 2007, they told the MPAA and Viacom that they would not use
Audible Magic to prevent copyright infringement without a licensing deal. JAIX2160. Also in February, Viacom and NBC wrote to Google and offered complete
cooperation to implement automated filtering technology. JAV-1357-59; JAIX-
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2314-19. Google’s General Counsel wrote back to both asserting that Google had
no obligation to use even readily available Audible Magic filtering to protect their
works from infringement on YouTube. JAIX-2160. Furthermore, Defendants’ internal emails confirm their policy of offering filtering only to content owners who
would agree to a licensing deal. See e.g., JAX-2486 (Google’s Sales Engineer relaying “the final verdict” that filtering protection “should only be given to signed,
non-music partners. This is what legal has authorized”).

6

While they used Audible Magic filtering to prevent infringement of their
content partners’ works, Defendants also developed their own proprietary filtering
system called “Content ID.” About a year later, with Schmidt’s billion-view goal
having been met and this lawsuit well underway, Defendants relented and decided
to make Content ID available to all content owners even in the absence of a license
agreement, and began using it to protect Viacom’s works in May 2008. JAXI2675.
III.

Viacom’s Dealings With Defendants
As YouTube rocketed to prominence in 2006, Viacom hired an outside

company, BayTSP, to investigate infringement of Viacom’s copyrights on YouTube and send takedown notices. Viacom initially prioritized its enforcement to
6

The New York Times even quoted Hurley saying YouTube would discuss using
filtering technology for “Viacom as part of a broader deal.” JAX-2508.
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target the most egregious infringement, such as pre-release of first-run movies or
“hot” content of certain minimum lengths, and subsequently revised its enforcement priorities as it learned more about the situation. JAIX-2207-08.
In summer 2006, Viacom negotiated with YouTube about a possible content
license, and YouTube offered to use automated filtering as part of the deal. JAXI2736-40. Those talks did not progress far, but were revived when Google acquired
YouTube. Given the possibility of a licensing deal, Viacom temporarily suspended
sending most takedown notices to YouTube, but demanded that any deal include
compensation for pre-license uploads because they were infringing. JAXI-266062; JAIX-2207. After protracted discussions, Defendants offered Viacom a licensing deal they valued at a minimum of $590 million, which included use of filtering
technology to block infringing uploads. JAXI-2660.
Ultimately, the negotiations broke down, and in the absence of a licensing
deal, Defendants refused to deploy filtering technology to protect Viacom’s content. JAXI-2664, 2666, 2670-71. In February 2007, Viacom sent YouTube takedown notices for more than 100,000 infringing clips. JAXI-2665. YouTube took
down the clips at the URLs specified in the takedown notices, but failed to prevent
the continued upload of infringing clips from the very same shows. JAXI-2672.
Viacom filed the present suit in March 2007. JAI-30.
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Both before and after filing suit, Viacom, through its own employees and
through third-party marketing firms, authorized the upload of certain carefully selected trailers and other promotional clips with the knowledge and assistance of
Defendants, and often at their urging. JAIX-2202-05, 2244. In the district court
and in the prior appeal, Defendants argued that this promotional activity was stealthy and made it impossible for them to distinguish authorized from infringing clips,
7

but the record shows that YouTube was well informed about these postings.

Moreover, even if Defendants did not know about every single authorized promotional clip, Viacom offered at the highest level to collaborate regarding “automated
solutions to identify infringing content and also to electronically tag authorized
8

content.” JAV-1359. Consistent with their policy of deliberately avoiding knowledge of specific infringing clips, Defendants refused all such cooperation. Tellingly, they have complained of no difficulty identifying authorized clips since
they began using their Content ID technology to protect Viacom’s works in 2008.

7

8

Even in an extreme, one-time case that Defendants have highlighted, in which a
Paramount employee appeared to go to lengths to hide the fact that the studio was
uploading a particular promotional clip, Paramount informed YouTube the next
day that the upload was authorized. JAIX-2242; see also JAIX-2240-41.
See also JAVIII-1992-97; JAX-2497-98 (Garfield Tr. 43:13-53:7 (explaining
MPAA’s offer to YouTube to assist in testing filtering software to recognize
“whitelist” of approved studio content and “blacklist” of unlicensed content, and
YouTube’s eventual rejection of MPAA’s offer.) )
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Procedural History
A.

Original Summary Judgment Proceedings

After fact discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Despite acknowledging that “a jury could find that the defendants not only were generally aware of, but welcomed, copyright-infringing material being placed on their
website,” the district court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Viacom’s, holding that the DMCA safe harbor immunized Defendants. SPA6, 30 (referred to hereafter as Viacom I).
Section 512(c)(1)(A) of the DMCA provides that a service provider loses the
safe harbor for user-generated content stored on its site if it had “actual knowledge” of infringement or “aware[ness] of facts and circumstances” indicating infringing activity and failed to take action. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). The district
court held that both refer to “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.” SPA15. Ignoring willful blindness, which Viacom had emphasized in its
briefing, the district court found as a matter of law that Defendants never obtained
such disqualifying knowledge, other than through takedown notices, to which – in
the court’s view – Defendants responded adequately. The district court also expressed the view that the takedown-notice regime in subsection 512(c)(3) provides
an adequate remedy for copyright owners. SPA16.
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Section 512(c)(1)(B) of the DMCA requires that to qualify for the safe harbor, a defendant must “not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). As to this exception, the district
court again imposed a specific-knowledge requirement, holding that Defendants
could not control infringement on YouTube because they did not have “itemspecific” knowledge of infringing clips. SPA25-26.
B.

First Appeal

Viacom appealed, and this Court reversed in part. Although it agreed with
the district court that “actual knowledge” and “aware[ness] of facts and circumstances” under Section 512(c)(1)(A) “apply only to specific instances of infringement,” the Court vacated the grant of summary judgment because “a reasonable
juror could conclude that YouTube had actual knowledge of specific infringing activity, or was at least aware of facts or circumstances from which specific infringing activity was apparent.” SPA49-50, 54 (referred to hereafter as Viacom II) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also held that willful blindness constitutes knowledge under the DMCA, where a defendant is aware of a high probability of infringement but deliberately shields itself from learning of specific infringing clips. Noting that the district court had failed to address willful blindness, the
Court remanded for consideration “whether the defendants made a deliberate effort
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to avoid guilty knowledge.” SPA56 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, this Court “counsel[ed] in favor of explicit fact finding on the issue of willful blindness.” SPA56 n.10.
This Court also reversed with respect to the “right and ability to control” under Section 512(c)(1)(B), holding that the district court “erred by importing a specific knowledge requirement” into that provision. SPA56-57 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Explaining that “control” under the DMCA “requires something
more than the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service
provider’s website,” this Court gave two examples of “something more”: (1) proof
of “inducement of copyright infringement under Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005),” and (2) the type of control present in
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
SPA59-60 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court remanded for a determination whether there are material disputes of fact under this standard. SPA60-61.
C.

Remand Summary Judgment Proceedings

On remand, Defendants again moved for summary judgment based on the
DMCA, resting on the same factual record. The district court granted the motion.
SPA96-97 (referred to hereafter as Viacom III).
With respect to knowledge or awareness under Section 512(c)(1)(A), the district court flipped the normal rule and held that the plaintiff copyright owner bears

21

Case: 13-1720

Document: 35

Page: 29

07/26/2013

1001125

67

the burden of proving that the service provider has specific disqualifying knowledge, even though the DMCA safe harbor is an affirmative defense. It cited the
notice-and-takedown provision in subsection 512(c)(3), which it read as a determination by Congress that “the burden of identifying what must be taken down is to
be on the copyright owner.” SPA79. Thus, even though “the defendants were
conscious that significant quantities of material on the YouTube website were infringing,” SPA51-52 (Viacom II), the district court held that they had no burden to
show that they lacked specific knowledge or awareness of any of Viacom’s clipsin-suit. And because YouTube’s internal records would not allow Viacom to identify which specific clips Defendants’ employees viewed, the district court concluded as a matter of law that Defendants should be deemed not to have had disqualifying knowledge. SPA77-79.
The court also concluded that Viacom had failed to raise a triable issue of
fact as to Defendants’ willful blindness. Instead of following this Court’s instruction to consider “whether the defendants made a deliberate effort to avoid guilty
knowledge,” and its recommendation in favor of explicit factual findings, the district court did neither. SPA56 & n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). It reasoned that the problem with the proffered willful blindness evidence was that it did
not identify “[t]he specific locations of infringements,” and “g[a]ve at most information that infringements were occurring with particular works, and occasional in-
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dications of promising areas to locate and remove them.” SPA82. Put differently,
the court seemingly concluded that even if Defendants were assumed to have all
the knowledge they willfully avoided, they still would have had to conduct some
follow-up investigation to locate specific infringing clips. As a result, the district
court held as a matter of law that Defendants could not be held liable on a willfulblindness theory. SPA83. But the district court discussed almost none of the actual willful-blindness evidence proffered by Viacom, including proof that filtering
technology would have detected and blocked illegal clips automatically but YouTube refused to apply it to Viacom’s content. SPA80-83.
With respect to the right-and-ability-to-control exception, the district court
did not apply the Grokster inducement standard as instructed by this Court. Instead, it held that control requires “participation in” or “coercion of” infringing activity of users, and that without such conduct a service provider’s “motivation” to
facilitate infringement is irrelevant. SPA91. In so doing, the district court ignored
the actual holdings in Grokster and in the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013), which
Viacom emphasized. Applying its own strict standard, the district court concluded
after a cursory review of the evidence that Defendants lacked control: while
“[t]hat evidence proves that YouTube for business reasons placed much of the bur-
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den on Viacom” continually to search the website for infringing clips, “[t]hat is
where it lies under the safe harbor.” SPA90 (internal quotation marks omitted).

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To prevail on the Section 512(c) safe-harbor affirmative defense, a service
provider must meet each of the following requirements: (1) it must not receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to infringing activity that it has the right and
ability to control; and (2) it must not obtain actual knowledge of infringement or
awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, or
if it does, it must act expeditiously to remove the infringing material. On remand,
in adjudicating these requirements, the district court failed to follow this Court’s
instructions and failed to apply the correct legal standards. The grant of summary
judgment must therefore be reversed.
First, YouTube profited from infringement it had the right and ability to control. In Viacom II, this Court held that the right and ability to control can be established through a showing of Grokster inducement or the types of control at issue in
Cybernet. YouTube had the right and ability to control the massive infringement

9

Viacom previously argued that Defendants’ syndication of clips-in-suit to third
parties fell outside the scope of the Section 512(c) safe harbor. This Court remanded that issue for further fact finding, SPA61-64, and the district court concluded that Defendants’ syndication fell within the safe harbor. SPA96. Viacom
is not appealing that portion of the district court’s summary judgment ruling.
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occurring on its site under both theories. The record shows that YouTube operated
its service “with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.” MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005).
YouTube purposefully (and successfully) built its business on infringement, attracting users and advertising revenue through the “major lure” of “blatantly illegal” clips of Viacom’s highly popular television shows and movies. That is enough
to constitute Grokster inducement. Nevertheless, the district court failed even to
consider YouTube’s Grokster intent, an issue seldom amenable to summary judgment. As for Cybernet, the record shows that YouTube actively designed and operated its service to take advantage of the fact that infringing uploads were drawing
in viewers and advertising revenue. Only by misapplying this Court’s instructions
and largely disregarding the record could the district court conclude that YouTube
lacked the right and ability to control infringement.
Second, YouTube had two types of disqualifying knowledge under the
DMCA, either of which is enough to deny YouTube the safe harbor: actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing clips, and knowledge of such clips imputed through willful blindness. As to the former, even in the face of extensive
evidence of YouTube’s review of infringing clips, including Viacom’s clips-insuit, the district court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on YouTube’s affirmative defense to Viacom to identify which specific clips-in-suit YouTube knew
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about. If the burden had been properly allocated, it would have been clear that
YouTube has not met its burden of showing that it lacked knowledge or awareness
of Viacom’s clips-in-suit. There is also at least a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether YouTube willfully blinded itself to infringement of Viacom’s clipsin-suit through its awareness of a high probability of infringement coupled with its
many deliberate efforts to avoid learning of specific instances of that infringement.
These efforts most notably include YouTube’s intentional refusal to deploy technologies that YouTube already was using for other select content owners.
ARGUMENT
This Court “reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo, drawing
all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” SPA47 (Viacom II).
“Summary judgment is inappropriate when the admissible materials in the record
make it arguable that the claim has merit,” or “[w]here an issue as to a material fact
cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to
evaluate their credibility.” Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174
(2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I.

Defendants Profited Directly From Infringing Activity They Had The
Right And Ability To Control.
Plaintiffs submitted strong evidence that Defendants earned a direct financial

benefit from infringement that they had the right and ability to control, and therefore forfeited the safe harbor under Section 512(c)(1)(B). Although the district
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court did not address “financial benefit,” it held that there was no evidence creating
a genuine dispute about whether YouTube had the “right and ability to control” infringing activity. But the record shows just the opposite, and the district court’s
ruling rests on fundamental misunderstandings of the evidence, this Court’s decision in Viacom II, and the DMCA itself. Because YouTube had the right and ability to control the infringing activity from which it profited—and because, at the
very least, there are genuine disputes of fact as to this issue—this Court should vacate the grant of summary judgment.
A.

YouTube Had The Ability To Control Infringing Activity That
Pervaded Its Website.

In Viacom II, this Court provided significant guidance on the meaning of the
DMCA’s “right-and-ability-to-control” language. Explaining that “right and ability to control” requires “something more” than the mere ability to block certain materials or users, this Court provided two highly relevant examples. SPA60. This
Court pointed to Grokster, and observed that “‘purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct’” aimed at inducing infringement might constitute the requisite “something more.” And the Court cited Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213
F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002), which held that a defendant exhibited “control”
over websites using its age verification service where it “instituted a monitoring
program,” “forbade certain types of content,” and “refused access to users who
failed to comply with its instructions.” SPA60. The Ninth Circuit subsequently
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endorsed this Court’s approach. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners
LLC, No. 09-55902, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 1092793, at *19 (9th Cir. Mar. 14,
2013); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1045–46 (9th Cir.
2013).
In Grokster, the Supreme Court determined that the defendants, who distributed peer-to-peer file sharing computer networking software with the intent to
foster infringement, could be liable for the infringing acts of third parties using
their software. The Court distinguished Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which held that distribution of a commercial
video tape recorder capable of substantial noninfringing uses could not give rise to
contributory liability unless the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement and failed to act on it. As Grokster explained, the earlier
case involved “no evidence that Sony had expressed an object of bringing about
taping in violation of copyright or had taken active steps to increase its profits from
unlawful taping.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931 (emphasis added). Thus, Sony did not
“require[] courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case
was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.” Id. at 934–35. Grokster therefore makes intent central to the inducement analysis. “One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
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to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Id. at 936–37; see also id. at 935.
By invoking Grokster in Viacom II, this Court indicated that YouTube’s operation of its service with the intent to foster infringement might well remove it
from the safe-harbor provision. That of course made perfect sense, as Congress
did not intend to immunize website hosts who operate with the hope and purpose
of profiting from infringement. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities,
Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he DMCA’s protection of
an innocent service provider disappears at the moment the service provider loses
its innocence”).
The Ninth Circuit embraced this reasoning in Fung. Citing this Court’s Viacom II decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on a Grokster inducement theory against a distributor of services and websites using a peer-to-peer
file-sharing protocol. 710 F.3d at 1045–46. The court pointed to the defendant’s
own statements manifesting his unlawful intent, his failure to develop filtering
tools to combat infringement, and his reliance on advertising revenue generated by
high-volume infringing use. It found “more than enough unrebutted evidence in
the summary judgment record to prove that Fung offered his services with the object of promoting their use to infringe copyrighted material.” Id. at 1035. The
court then held that Fung had the right and ability to control infringing activity—
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and thus was ineligible for the DMCA safe harbor—because he “engaged in culpable, inducing activity like that in Grokster.” Id. at 1046.
Fung rejected the notion that a service provider needed to expressly encourage infringing use of the service in order to forfeit the DMCA safe harbor as a
Grokster inducer. All that is required, it held, is intent to host and profit from infringement. Fung also explained what evidence bears on a finding of Grokster intent: As in Grokster itself, defendants’ “explicit internal communication[s]” are
“pertinent to proof of improper purpose,” regardless of “[w]hether the messages
were communicated [to customers].” Id. at 1035 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at
936–37 (final bracket added)). That is because “[t]he function of the message in
the theory of inducement is to prove by a defendant’s own statements that his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). And as noted above, Fung, again expressly following Grokster, found
highly relevant the defendant’s failure to develop filtering tools to diminish infringing activity, as well as his reliance on advertising sales, which in turn depend
on high-volume infringing use. Id. at 1035–36.
Finally, the Fung court “ha[d] no difficulty concluding that where the
512(c)(1)(B) safe harbor requirements are not met, the service provider loses protection with regard to any infringing activity using the service.” Id. at 1046 (emphasis added). As the court explained, the right and ability to control (like com-
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mon law vicarious liability) depends on “the overall relationship between the service provider and infringing users,” rather than any item-specific knowledge of or
ability to remove infringing material. Id.; see Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940 n.13 (inducement liability “goes beyond” cases in which a defendant “encourage[s] a particular consumer to infringe a copyright”; instead, “distribution of a product can
itself give rise to liability where evidence shows that the distributor intended and
encouraged the product to be used to infringe”); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 983-84 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“Grokster
II”) (“liability may attach even if the defendant does not induce specific acts of infringement”).
Applying these standards to the record here, a jury could reasonably conclude that YouTube operated its service with the intent that it be used to infringe.
To start, “[w]hile infringing use by third parties is not by itself evidence of [YouTube’s] intent, the staggering scale of infringement makes it more likely that
[YouTube] condoned illegal use, and provides the backdrop against which all of
[its] actions must be assessed.” Grokster II, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 985. Moreover, as
in Grokster, the YouTube founders intentionally adopted a business model that depended on infringement. See supra pp. 4-13. They made the conscious decision—
revealed through their own words—to build their user base “as aggressively as we
can through whatever tactics, however evil.” JAV-1173. This effort included par-
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ticipating in copyright infringement themselves, refusing to block even “the obviously copyright infringing stuff,” disabling community flagging for infringement, avoiding or eliminating simple engineering fixes that would have made it
easier to detect and deter infringement, and refusing to deploy filtering technology
that was already in use for preferred content owners who acquiesced to YouTube’s
licensing terms. JAXI-2259-60, 2574-76, 2577, 2584-87; 2588-89; 2596-97, 2599.
The evidence showing the Grokster intent of Google as YouTube’s purchaser is equally powerful. Aware that YouTube was a “‘rogue enabler’ of content
theft” whose “business model is completely sustained by pirated content,” Google
nevertheless chose to buy it. JAII-445, 455. Indeed, Google’s financial advisor,
Credit Suisse, warned Google’s board that 54% of YouTube’s video views were of
infringing content. JAVI-1417 (explaining that 60% of total video streams were
“Premium,” and assuming that only 10% of that content was authorized); see also
JAXI-2636-37. And, post-acquisition, Google clearly intended to keep the illgotten profits coming: It abandoned the prior Google Video policy of reviewing
each video at upload and blocking those that blatantly infringed copyrights and
adopted YouTube’s copyright policy to “increase traffic knowing beforehand that
we’ll profit from illegal [d]ownloads.” JAXI-2648-49; JAIII-575. Given these
statements—and others in the vast summary judgment record—a jury easily could
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find that YouTube operated its website “with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37.10
The district court discounted this evidence because it misunderstood Grokster and this Court’s reliance on it in Viacom II. Although Grokster expressly held
that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright…is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties,” 545
U.S. at 936-37, the district court plainly believed that intent and distribution were
insufficient to remove Defendants from the safe harbor. Instead, the district court
required that Viacom demonstrate YouTube’s “participation in, []or coercion of,
user infringement.” SPA91. The district court’s heightened standard, however, is
contrary to this Court’s citation to Grokster, which makes clear that “the distribution of a product can itself give rise to liability” even without evidence that the defendant “encourage[d] a particular consumer to infringe.”11 545 U.S. at 940 n.13.

10

11

Moreover, as this Court has explained, “summary judgment is generally inappropriate where questions of intent and state of mind are implicated.” Gelb v.
Bd. of Elections, 224 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2000).
The district court’s heightened standard also reflects a misunderstanding of the
role of item-specific knowledge under the safe harbor. In Viacom II, this Court
held that the district court had “erred by importing a specific knowledge requirement into the control and benefit provision,” and pointed to Grokster as an
example of a case in which a service provider has the right and ability to control
“without necessarily—or even frequently—acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.” SPA56-57, 60. Yet on remand, the district court characterized Viacom II’s citation of Grokster as reaffirming that “the DMCA requires
[Footnote continued on next page]
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And that mistaken standard caused the district court to ignore evidence that, like
the defendants in Grokster and Fung, YouTube’s founders clearly intended to
build a business based on infringement, which Google knowingly opted to continue.12
In any event, the evidence in this case (and the district court’s misunderstanding) is not limited to the Defendants’ “bad hearts.” The record also demonstrates that YouTube acted on its intentions, actively designing and operating its
service to take advantage of the fact that infringing uploads would continue to
draw viewers and advertising revenue. Like the defendant in Cybernet, YouTube
prescribed detailed rules regarding acceptable content, which it enforced through a
“monitoring program.” 213 F. Supp. at 1173; see also Fung, 710 F.3d at 1046 (de[Footnote continued from previous page]

12

‘actual knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that indicate specific
and identifiable instances of infringement.’” SPA85 (citation omitted).
The district court likened this case to UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital
Partners LLC, No. 09-55902, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 1092793, at *19 (9th Cir.
Mar. 14, 2013), in which the same Ninth Circuit panel as in Fung held that a
plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding control. SPA93-94. The
summary judgment record there, however, was far less extensive than that at issue here: It established only that “(a) the allegedly infringing material resided
on Veoh’s system; (b) Veoh had the ability to remove such material; (c) Veoh
could have implemented, and did implement, filtering systems; and (d) Veoh
could have searched for infringing content.” 2013 WL 1092793, at *19 (quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Not only did YouTube exercise far
more editorial control than Veoh, see infra pp. 34-36, but there also was little
evidence of Veoh’s intent to induce infringement, in contrast to the overwhelming evidence of intent here. See supra pp. 31-32.
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fendant “personally removed ‘fake[], infected, or otherwise bad or abusive torrents’ in order to ‘protect[] the integrity of [his websites’] search index[es]’” (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original)). YouTube’s terms of service give it the discretion to block or remove any video, or to deem content “racy”
and restrict its availability to users who satisfy age-verification requirements.
JAXI-2706-07; JAII-285.

The founders themselves extensively monitored the

website initially and removed videos that ran afoul of their editorial preferences,
while maintaining infringing content because it provided a “major lure” to users.
JAXI-2526-28, 2533-51; JAVIII-1981.
When greater volume made it more difficult to review every upload, YouTube implemented a community flagging program in which users “flagged” videos
for review by YouTube employees. JAXI-2552-54. After a few weeks, YouTube
disabled the program with respect to copyright infringement but maintained it for
pornography, hate speech, and other content YouTube found objectionable. JAXI2554-56. A jury easily could infer that YouTube took this action to foster infringement, and that its selective use of community flagging sent a message to
YouTube users that the website was a safe place for infringement, thereby encouraging such activity.
YouTube also shaped the content on its website through its discriminatory
deployment of filtering software. Only site operators like YouTube can prevent
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piracy by filtering out infringing content at upload, before it ever becomes public.
That is why content owners like Viacom, the MPAA, and many others demanded
that YouTube adopt readily-available filtering software. At various times relevant
to the infringement of the clips-in-suit, YouTube used Audible Magic software to
screen out videos at upload for the benefit of YouTube’s licensing partners. JAXI2670-71, 2725-42. Indeed, the filtering tools were so well developed that Defendants committed to their licensing partners that they would swiftly identify and
remove upwards of 95% of their infringing content. E.g., JAIV-890. But because
Viacom had not licensed its content to YouTube, Defendants refused to use that
very same tool to prevent infringement of Viacom’s works, even though doing so
would be almost costless. JAXI-2725-29. Defendants’ selective use of Audible
Magic as leverage in negotiating licensing deals further demonstrates that Defendants actively exercised editorial control directly related to the infringing content
on YouTube. JAXI-2730-40; JAIV-890; JAV-1152.13

13

YouTube also engages in extensive efforts, including employee-“editor” reviews
and automated algorithms, to organize videos on the site by subject matter and
popularity, and to steer viewers towards videos that YouTube believes will enhance viewers’ entertainment experience. JAXI-2752-53, 2754-57, 2758-60. In
this way, YouTube “ma[kes] it easier for users to share” and find “copyrighted
content.” Grokster II, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 987-88. The district court, however,
ignored evidence of “editor” reviews, and discounted evidence that YouTube’s
“automated system”—which of course, was initially designed by YouTube employees—helps users locate infringing works. SPA91-92.
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To the extent the district court even considered record evidence of YouTube’s editorial control at all, it improperly discounted it because the court once
again misunderstood the DMCA and Viacom II. The court placed heavy emphasis
on Section 512(m), which provides that safe-harbor protection shall not be conditioned on “a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts
indicating infringing activity.” 17 U.S.C § 512(m). On the court’s view, Section
512(m) makes all decisions regarding monitoring irrelevant to the right-andability-to-control analysis, regardless of whether the defendant chooses to monitor
or filter for some offensive or infringing content, and “regardless of the[] motivation” behind the defendant’s policies. SPA91.14
Section 512(m) does not have such an all-encompassing reach. It states only
that service providers need not affirmatively adopt monitoring systems to enjoy the
protection of the DMCA’s safe harbor; it does not prevent a court from considering, as part of the Section 512(c)(1)(B) analysis, a defendant’s actual exercise of
control over its service, including its decisions to exclude some objectionable content while allowing, and thus encouraging, copyright infringement. Even in the absence of an affirmative duty to monitor, a party that curates the content on its web-

14

In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on a portion of Viacom II that
did not consider the right and ability to control, but instead interpreted a different part of the statute—§ 512(i)—that is not at issue here.
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site may be held liable for “welcoming” infringing activity. This is particularly so
given that YouTube’s monitoring efforts like community flagging were visible to
the public, and their selective use sent a clear, encouraging message to would-be
infringers. Moreover, nothing in Section 512(m) suggests that it protects a service
provider’s decision to implement a monitoring program selectively so as to extract
favorable licensing deals from content owners.
In light of the factual record showing YouTube’s clear intent that its website
be used for infringement, and its actions to encourage that infringement, YouTube
was not entitled to summary judgment regarding its “right and ability to control”
the infringement that pervaded its website.
B.

YouTube Received Enormous Financial Benefits Directly Attributable To The Infringing Activity.

YouTube also satisfies the other half of the Section 512(c)(1)(B) exception
because it received a “financial benefit directly attributable to infringing activity.”
There can be no serious doubt that a service provider derives a financial benefit directly from infringing activity where, as here, its revenue depends on advertising
sales stoked by the amount and popularity of infringement on its website.
Several cases have held that the “direct financial benefit” standard “should
be interpreted consistent with the similarly-worded common law standard for vicarious copyright liability.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1107
(9th Cir. 2007); see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d
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1099, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d in part sub nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, No. 09-55902, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 1092793 (9th Cir.
Mar. 14, 2013). As those cases explain, the DMCA standard, like its common-law
counterpart, is satisfied if infringing material “draw[s]” customers from whom the
defendant derives revenue. See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1117 (“relevant inquiry” under
the DMCA is “whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for subscribers”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Cybernet, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1171, 1181 (finding direct financial benefit “from the draw posed by the existence of these [infringing] works”); see also, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d
304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (under common law, dancehall operators liable for infringing performances by bands because infringement provided “proprietor with a
source of customers and enhanced income”).
Where a service provider funds its activities through advertising rather than
charging its users a fee, the provider obtains a financial benefit directly attributable
to infringement if the infringement draws users, who in turn attract advertisers.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fung drives the point home. Although the court
explained that its prior opinions applying the “draw” standard had arisen “in the
context of service providers who charge [subscribers] for their services,” it found
that the defendant received a direct financial benefit by “selling advertising space
on his websites,” which “depended on the number of users who viewed and then
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clicked on the advertisements.” 710 F.3d at 1044-45. As the Ninth Circuit noted,
the “vast amount of infringing materials on [the defendant’s] websites … support[ed] an inference that [his] revenue stream [w]as predicated on the broad availability of infringing materials for his users.” Id. at 1045; Arista Records LLC v.
Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding common-law
direct financial interest where Internet file-sharing service “profited from its ability
to attract infringing users, including through increased advertising revenue”).
YouTube clearly received a “direct financial benefit” from infringement. Its
own founders realized that infringement was the primary driver of traffic to the
website. And it was this large user base that attracted advertisers and made YouTube the most valuable video-sharing website, causing Google to purchase the
company for $1.65 billion a mere year and a half after the site was founded. See
JAXI-2639-44. Moreover, until January 2007, YouTube obtained additional financial benefits from copyright infringement by placing ads on the very pages
where users viewed infringing clips (“watch pages”). JAXI-2689, 2691-92, 2694.
Even after Google’s lawyers abruptly stopped this practice for “legal reasons,”
JAIII-791, YouTube continued to profit from users drawn to the site by infringing
material through its sales of ads on YouTube’s home, search, browse, and upload
pages. JAXI-2694-96. By increasing the traffic on these pages—and thus allowing YouTube to reap greater profits from advertising—the infringing material pro-

40

Case: 13-1720

Document: 35

Page: 48

07/26/2013

1001125

67

vided a direct financial benefit. See Fung, 710 F.3d at 1045; Cybernet, 213 F.
Supp. 2d at 1181; Lime Group, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 435.
In sum, the record demonstrates that YouTube had the right and ability to
control infringing activity from which it received a direct financial benefit—but
instead strategically exercised its control to encourage infringement in order to
grow the site as quickly as possible and sell it at a huge profit. At the very least,
the evidence is sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether YouTube is excluded from the safe harbor under Section 512(c)(1)(B).
II.

Defendants Had Actual Knowledge And Awareness Of Rampant Infringement Of Viacom’s Clips-In-Suit.
Viacom II clarified that the actual knowledge and awareness provisions of

Section 512(c)(1)(A) apply only to specific instances of infringement and that a
service provider can obtain such knowledge or awareness in two ways: (1) through
actual knowledge of specific infringements or subjective awareness of facts that
make specific instances of infringement objectively obvious to a reasonable person; or (2) through willful blindness, where the defendant is aware of a high probability of infringement of the plaintiff’s works but deliberately avoids knowledge
of the specific infringing clips. SPA49-51, 55-56.
On remand, the district court erred in multiple respects in addressing the
knowledge prong of the DMCA. Although the DMCA is an affirmative defense,
the district court shifted the burden of proof to Viacom to identify which specific
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clips-in-suit Defendants were aware of, even in the face of extensive evidence that
Defendants had viewed countless clips-in-suit. The district court also misapplied
the willful-blindness doctrine by effectively limiting it to circumstances where a
service provider is already aware of the location (i.e. URL) of specific infringing
clips but chooses to ignore those clips.
A.

Defendants Failed To Satisfy Their Burden Of Showing That
They Lacked Actual Knowledge Or Awareness Of Viacom’s
Clips-In-Suit.

Although the record is replete with evidence that Defendants viewed countless infringing clips, including Viacom clips-in-suit, the district court granted
summary judgment to Defendants because Viacom could not identify which specific clips-in-suit Defendants knew about. This result is premised on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the DMCA affirmative defense and the applicable burden of
proof.
Viacom’s affirmative claims for direct infringement, Grokster inducement,
and vicarious liability do not require proof that YouTube had knowledge of specific infringements. See Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117-18 (2d Cir.
2010) (direct infringement); Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940 (Grokster inducement);
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (vicarious liability). However, in order “to meet the eligibility requirements of the 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) ‘safe harbor’ provision,” YouTube “must show,
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inter alia, that it did not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing and was not aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also ALS
Scan, 239 F.3d at 625 (“This immunity, however, is not presumptive, but granted
only to ‘innocent’ service providers who can prove they do not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement, as defined under any of the three prongs
of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).”). The burden of proof is on the service provider because the DMCA is an affirmative defense. E.g., Fung, 710 F.3d at 1039 (“Because the DMCA safe harbors are affirmative defenses, Fung has the burden of establishing that he meets the statutory requirements.”).
To be sure, the situation here is an uncommon one. In the ordinary case,
where evidence of Grokster intent and extensive awareness of infringement is absent, a service provider will readily be able to meet its burden of showing that it
lacked disqualifying knowledge. It can simply demonstrate, for example, that it
had no ability or no occasion to monitor its site. But where, as here, the record reflects that defendants had extensive knowledge of the infringement of Viacom content on YouTube and even viewed many “blatantly illegal” Viacom clips themselves (though defendants’ records do not establish precisely which ones), the
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proper outcome is to hold that the defendants have failed to carry their burden of
showing lack of knowledge with regard to the clips-in-suit.
The district court, however, held that the DMCA reverses the normal rule
that the party asserting an affirmative defense must prove its elements. It reasoned
that because the DMCA “places the burden of notifying [] service providers of infringements upon the copyright owner or his agent” when a copyright owner invokes the takedown procedure in Section 512(c)(3), “the burden of showing that
YouTube knew or was aware of the specific infringements of the works in suit
cannot be shifted to YouTube to disprove” under Section 512(c)(1)(A). SPA79.
Nothing in the text, structure, or the legislative history of the DMCA supports this conclusion. That a copyright owner must identify infringing works with
specificity in a takedown notice is irrelevant to the burden of proof under Section
512(c)(1)(A). As this Court explained in Viacom II, a service provider’s duty to
respond to a takedown notice is distinct from its duty to remove infringing content
of which it becomes aware absent such a notice: “actual knowledge of infringing
material, awareness of facts or circumstances that make infringing activity apparent, or receipt of a takedown notice will each trigger an obligation to expeditiously
remove the infringing material.” SPA43 (emphasis added). The takedown notice
regime thus cannot be read to reverse the burden of proof.
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The DMCA is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, and nothing
in the statute suggests a departure from the “longstanding convention” that a defendant asserting an affirmative defense bears the burden of proof. E.g., Meacham
v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 91-92 (2008) (explaining that “Congress writes laws” against the “backdrop” of this “longstanding convention” and
that the Supreme Court respects it absent “compelling reasons to think that Congress meant to put the burden of persuasion on the other side.”). Furthermore, both
the legislative history and case law confirm that the service provider asserting the
DMCA safe harbor bears the burden of establishing eligibility. H.R. Rep. No. 105551(I), at 26 (1998) (“a defendant asserting this exemption or limitation [codified
at § 512(c)] as an affirmative defense in such a suit bears the burden of establishing
its entitlement”); e.g., Fung, 710 F.3d at 1038; Wolk, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 746; Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

15

15

That the DMCA affirmative defense requires a service provider to prove a negative – lack of knowledge – does not alter the allocation of the burden of proof.
Such requirements are commonplace in statutory affirmative defenses. E.g.,
United States v. 15 Bosworth St., 236 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2001) (defendant
in civil forfeiture case “bears the burden of proving the absence of knowledge or
consent,” and “[e]ven when the burden is to prove a negative [–] here, the lack
of knowledge or consent [–] the absence of evidence on the issue redounds to the
detriment of the burden-holder”); In re Bay Runner Rentals, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
2d 795, 805 (D. Md. 2000) (defendant in admiralty law case “must prove the
negative proposition of the absence or lack of its privity or knowledge”); Terracciano v. McAlinden Const. Co., 485 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1973) (same).
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As this Court itself observed, the record in this action includes examples
from which “a reasonable juror could conclude that YouTube had actual knowledge of specific infringing activity, or was at least aware of facts or circumstances
from which specific infringing activity was apparent.” SPA54. One example this
Court pointed to is the Karim report presented to YouTube’s board of directors in
March 2006, which identified specific Viacom programs and stated that “blatantly
illegal” clips of those programs “can still be found” on YouTube “as of today.”
SPA52-53. Based on the report, this Court found that “[a] reasonable juror could
conclude” that “Karim knew of the presence of Viacom-owned material on YouTube, since he presumably located specific clips of the shows in question,” that
“Karim believed the clips he located to be infringing,” and that YouTube did not
remove the clips “until conducting ‘a more thorough analysis,’ thus exposing the
company to liability in the interim.” SPA53.
On remand, Viacom proffered additional evidence that hundreds of Viacom’s clips-in-suit from the programs Karim named were on YouTube when Karim submitted his report, and that YouTube did not remove them until many
months later. JAXI-2581-83, 2779. Placing the burden of proof on the wrong party, the district court faulted Viacom for its inability to identify which of those hundreds of clips Karim (or others at YouTube) actually viewed – a result that was all
the more improper given that YouTube alone controls that evidence and has stead-
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fastly refused to produce Karim’s YouTube viewing records for the months leading
up to his report. JAIX-2439; see also Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 720
(2013) (“where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of
a party, that party is best situated to bear the burden of proof” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In yet another example, Viacom proffered evidence on remand that YouTube employees actually viewed over 3,000 specific clips-in-suit that had been
flagged for potential terms-of-use violations (other than copyright), and those employees had “approved” them to remain on YouTube. JAXI-2780 (Wilkens Decl.
¶ 2(e)); JAXII-2800-2921. A reasonable jury could conclude that YouTube employees were aware of these specific clips, given that they reviewed and approved
them. And yet the district court entirely disregarded this evidence of YouTube’s
disqualifying knowledge.
Although Viacom can prove YouTube’s awareness of some of the specific
clips-in-suit, Viacom conceded on remand that, given the limitations of the records
maintained and produced by YouTube, Viacom cannot identify all or even most of
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But Viacom does

not bear the burden of making that showing.
B.

Defendants Were Willfully Blind To Their Users’ Acts Of Infringement.

This Court held that willful blindness is knowledge under the DMCA, and
squarely rejected YouTube’s argument that Section 512(m) abrogates the willfulblindness doctrine. SPA55-56. In remanding the case, this Court instructed the
district court to conduct an inquiry into whether Defendants “made a deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge,” and cautioned that such an inquiry often requires
explicit fact finding at trial. SPA56 & n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The decision below acknowledged the record evidence that YouTube had
“information that infringements were occurring with particular works” belonging
to Viacom, and also had “indications of promising areas to locate and remove”
those infringements. SPA82. However, the court held that because Viacom’s evidence did not identify the precise locations of specific infringing clips, there had
been “no showing of willful blindness.” SPA83. The district court apparently believed that even if Defendants had opened their eyes to Viacom’s evidence, Defendants would not immediately have had knowledge of specific infringing clips, but
16

As noted earlier, YouTube failed to retain and produce the co-founders’ emails
for the critical 18-month period from YouTube’s founding until its acquisition
by Google. See supra p. 4 n.3.

48

Case: 13-1720

Document: 35

Page: 56

07/26/2013

1001125

67

rather would have had to take some additional measures to locate those clips –
something the district court believed Defendants were not required to do. Thus,
under the district court’s interpretation, a service provider cannot be willfully blind
unless it already has information identifying the “[t]he specific locations of infringements” and then chooses to disregard that information. SPA82. To illustrate
the point, if a service provider knows that The Daily Show is being repeatedly infringed on its service, but the service provider deliberately avoids learning the location of specific infringing Daily Show clips, then under the district court’s reading the service provider is not willfully blind. It can rest assured in its deliberate
ignorance and has no duty to take any action to locate the infringing clips of The
Daily Show that it knows are there.
The district court’s approach is perverse, squarely at odds with this Court’s
instructions in the previous appeal, and contrary to the law of willful blindness
more generally. It is also based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the summary judgment record, which the court virtually ignored.
First, the district court’s interpretation renders the willful-blindness doctrine
superfluous, because a defendant who is aware of the specific location of infringing clips but deliberately ignores them already has disqualifying knowledge or
awareness under Section 512(c)(1)(A). Worse still, the district court’s interpretation actually encourages defendants to engage in willful blindness as that doctrine
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has been defined by this Court: defendants who are aware of a high probability of
infringement of a plaintiffs’ works on their service can escape liability simply by
deliberately taking steps to avoid learning of the specific location of the infringements.
This Court’s previous decision makes clear that the willful-blindness doctrine applies to a defendant who has “reason to suspect that users of its service” are
infringing a plaintiff’s copyrights, but “shield[s] itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking the other way.” SPA55 (quoting Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted)). Tiffany itself underscores the district court’s error, explaining that willful blindness
may be used to charge a service provider with knowledge of specific infringements
where it “had reason to suspect that [infringing items] were being sold through its
website, and intentionally shielded itself from discovering the offending listings or
the identity of the sellers behind them.” 600 F.3d at 109 (emphasis added).
The district court mistakenly believed that Section 512(m) “excuses YouTube” from engaging in any investigation to identify specific infringing clips, even
if YouTube is aware of a high probability that the infringement is occurring.
SPA83. This Court, however, has already explicitly rejected that overbroad reading of Section 512(m), explaining “willful blindness cannot be defined as an affirmative duty to monitor,” because willful blindness necessarily involves
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“aware[ness] of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoid[ing]
confirming that fact.” Id. at 80-81 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the
doctrine of willful blindness, if a service provider is aware of a high probability of
infringement occurring on its service, the service provider cannot bury its head in
the sand in order to avoid learning of specific infringing clips, such as by deliberately refusing to conduct a reasonable follow-up inquiry, or deliberately turning
17

off or selectively deploying anti-infringement tools.

Thus in Tiffany, this Court quoted with approval the Seventh Circuit’s
statement that “[t]o be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.” Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109 (quoting Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added)). And in Viacom II, this Court quoted with approval its holding
in United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003), that a person
is willfully blind where he “was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute
and consciously avoided confirming that fact.” (emphasis added; quotation marks

17

The district court also cited Shelter Capital in support of its mangled interpretation of willful blindness, SPA82, but Shelter Capital contradicts the district
court’s interpretation. 2013 WL 1092793, at *12. The Ninth Circuit made clear,
citing Viacom II, that “a service provider cannot willfully bury its head in the
sand to avoid obtaining . . . specific knowledge,” and, in contrast to the record
here, found “no evidence that Veoh acted in such a manner.” Id. (emphasis added).
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omitted). These and other appellate cases make clear that deliberately avoiding
guilty knowledge includes consciously refusing to take “basic investigatory steps”
or “make further inquiries” when faced with a high likelihood of wrongdoing.
E.g., United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 57 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v.
Butler, 646 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2011). In short, this Court’s articulation of
willful blindness in Viacom II and Tiffany cannot be squared with the district
court’s rejection of its application whenever the defendant would have to engage in
some additional inquiry to learn the location of specific infringing clips.
The district court compounded its legal error by ignoring or misinterpreting
extensive evidence that Defendants made a “deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge.” SPA56 (quotation marks omitted). First, there is no real dispute that Defendants were aware of the “high probability” of the infringement of countless
Viacom works on their system. The record is replete with evidence that Defendants were aware of the widespread infringement of Viacom’s works in particular:
(a) YouTube’s founders and key employees reviewed countless clips and recognized many of them, including “comedy clips,” a Viacom specialty, as blatantly
infringing – clips accounting for 75% - 80% of YouTube’s site traffic by Chen’s
and Dunton’s estimates; (b) Jawed Karim’s report to YouTube’s board called out
many Viacom programs by name – “South Park, MTV Cribs, Daily Show, Reno
911, [and] Dave Chappelle” – and identified the clips of those shows as “blatantly
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illegal;” (c) Google’s review of YouTube before acquiring it showed that YouTube was “a ‘rogue enabler’ of content theft,” “completely sustained by pirated
content,” such that 54% of YouTube’s video views were of infringing content; and
(d) in licensing negotiations, Defendants offered Viacom a package worth more
than $590 million, precisely because they recognized that the Viacom content on
YouTube was an enormous draw to users. See supra pp. 5-14, 17. YouTube not
only “ha[d] reason to suspect that users of its service [were] infringing” Viacom’s
works en masse, but the record also establishes that YouTube knew this was occurring to the point of certainty. SPA55 (quotation marks omitted).
Second, Viacom also presented extensive evidence from which a jury could
readily conclude that YouTube had “intentionally shielded itself from discovering
the offending [videos]….” Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109 (emphasis added), and “consciously avoided confirming” the specific infringements of Viacom’s works.
SPA56 (quotation marks omitted). While knowing of the high probability of the
rampant infringement of Viacom’s works, Defendants reviewed more than 3,000
Viacom clips-in-suit for potential terms of use violations other than copyright, and
“approved” those clips to remain on YouTube. See supra p. 10. Accordingly, the
district court was simply wrong in concluding that Viacom’s evidence did not
identify any specific clips. More importantly, the evidence shows that in order to
avoid guilty knowledge, Defendants deliberately disabled or withheld numerous
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anti-infringement tools that were designed to and would have identified specific
infringing clips without any need for Defendants to find them. Thus, the district
court was also wrong in claiming that under the evidence proffered by Viacom,
“YouTube is left to find the infringing clip[s].” SPA82.
Notably, as discussed above, YouTube disabled “community flagging” for
copyright infringement just two weeks after it was implemented, for the express
purpose of avoiding notice of specific infringements, and YouTube also cancelled
the imminent implementation of an automated anti-infringement tool that would
have alerted copyright owners, like Viacom, when suspected infringing content
was uploaded, because YouTube “hate[d] making it easier for these a-holes [copyright owners]” to prevent infringement. See supra pp. 9-11. When YouTube initially decided not to test or adopt filtering technology, YouTube’s general counsel
admitted that YouTube’s refusal stemmed from its awareness that “copyrighted
content on YouTube [is] a major lure for [YouTube’s] users.” See supra pp. 1213. And when YouTube eventually did implement Audible Magic filtering to
identify and remove specific infringing clips, it carefully gerrymandered the system to ensure that it would never provide YouTube with knowledge of infringing
clips belonging to copyright owners, like Viacom, that had declined to license their
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All of these tools were designed to

identify specific infringing clips through automated processes, obviating the need
for YouTube to search for such clips.
Last but not least, the Karim report to YouTube’s board underscores YouTube’s willful blindness. It is undisputed that hundreds of Viacom clips-in-suit of
the shows referenced in the Karim report were on YouTube when Karim submitted
the memo, and that YouTube took no action to remove those clips until many
months later. See supra pp. 11-12. A jury could reasonably infer that the board’s
failure to take any action in response to the Karim memo was a deliberate effort to
avoid guilty knowledge.
The stark contrast between the record of YouTube’s conduct in this case and
the record of eBay’s conduct in Tiffany is instructive. The district court found in
Tiffany, after fully weighing the evidence as the trier of fact, that eBay engaged in
numerous anti-infringement efforts indicating that it did not deliberately turn a
blind eye to infringement, including “invest[ing] as much as $20 million each year
on tools to promote trust and safety on its website,” assigning more than 200 individuals “exclusively on combating infringement,” and spending over $5 million
18

YouTube also rejected offers from Viacom and the MPAA to have their technology experts assist YouTube in using technical means to identify and block unauthorized content from the site, and to distinguish “whitelists” of approved studio
content from “blacklists” of unlicensed studio content. See supra p. 18 & n.8.
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per year “in maintaining and enhancing its fraud engine . . . .” Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). The district court found that eBay implemented
anti-fraud measures “as soon as it was reasonably and technologically capable of
doing so.” Id. at 514. Here YouTube did the reverse. Unlike eBay, YouTube disabled community flagging for copyright, denied existing Audible Magic filtering to
Viacom and other content owners who would not agree to YouTube’s licensing
terms, killed other anti-infringement tools, and even in late 2006 had only 3-5 personnel working on copyright-related issues. See supra pp. 9-11; JAXI-2580, 258486; JAXVI-4145 (Gillette Tr. at 35:4-37:18).
There is no doubt that if YouTube had not taken these many deliberate actions to avoid knowledge of specific instances of infringement, YouTube would
have identified and blocked Viacom’s clips-in-suit. For example, YouTube would
have followed up on the Karim memo (e.g., by asking Karim which “blatantly illegal” videos he saw, or by running the same simple searches for “Daily Show,”
“Colbert,” and “South Park” that Karim no doubt used); YouTube would have continued community flagging for copyright and used its “army” of content reviewers
to review and remove clips for copyright infringement (instead of only for other
terms of use violations); YouTube would have implemented the other simple antiinfringement tools that it cancelled; and most importantly YouTube would have
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employed Audible Magic filtering for Viacom (instead of reserving it for YouTube’s licensing partners), which would have automatically and instantaneously
identified and blocked infringing clips once Viacom’s reference fingerprints were
loaded into the filter.
The district court did not analyze or even mention any of the extensive evidence of YouTube’s willful blindness, save for the Karim memo. Instead, the district court ignored all of it on the erroneous view that Defendants were under no
obligation “to find the infringing clip[s],” notwithstanding their awareness of a
high probability that Viacom’s television shows and movies were being infringed
on a massive scale. SPA82 & n.3.

19

Under the proper willful-blindness standard

articulated by this Court, summary judgment must be reversed.
III.

This Court Should Exercise Its Discretion To Remand The Case To A
Different District Court Judge.
Given the protracted nature of this litigation (the case is now well into its se-

venth year) and the evident firmness of the district court’s erroneous views regarding the DMCA, this Court should exercise its discretion to remand the case to a
different judge “to preserve the appearance of justice.” E.g., United States v. Rob-

19

This holding, again, mistakes this Court’s discussion of YouTube’s content recognition tools in the context of 512(i) with a holding that those tools must be excluded from consideration in determining whether YouTube satisfies the requirements of 512(c). The Court reached no such holding. See supra note 14.
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in, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977). Reassignment would “not imply any personal
criticism of the . . . judge,” nor would it “create disproportionate waste or duplication of effort,” given that the case has yet to go to trial. Scott v. Perkins, 150 F.
App’x 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
Because YouTube cannot satisfy either of two required elements for application of the DMCA safe harbor, the district court erred in again granting summary
judgment to YouTube. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the judgment below
and remand the case to a different district court judge for trial.
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